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New Zealand has to date enjoyed the luxury of engaging with the modern investment treaty regime 
through only three free-trade agreements with compulsory investor-State arbitration clauses. This 
may be about to change. New Zealand is negotiating a series of further free-trade agreements, 
including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, many of which are likely to provide for 
investor-State dispute resolution. New Zealand faces a choice in these negotiations: should it reject 
investment treaty arbitration on the basis that the risks, especially the perceived risks of restricted 
freedom to regulate, are too great or instead seek to make use of the opportunities investment treaty 
arbitration presents? This article looks at the evolving system of investment treaty arbitration and 
the different ways in which States seek to make use of it, with a focus on the Netherlands, the United 
States, and New Zealand.  
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I INTRODUCTION  
The conceit in the title draws on the historical link between New Zealand and the Netherlands. It 
was the Dutchman Abel Tasman who "discovered" New Zealand and an anonymous cartographer at 
the Dutch East India Company who was responsible for naming it:1 
Tasman called the new country Staten Land, because he speculated that it might be the western 
extremity of the Staten Land off the south-west coast of South America … When late in 1643 this was 
perceived to be an impossibility … an anonymous cartographer in the Dutch East India Company 
renamed Tasman's line of coast "Nieuw Zeeland" or, in Latin, "Zelandia Nova." … By the late 
eighteenth century this scratch of coastline would be identified variously as New Zeeland, New Zeland 
and, eventually, New Zealand.  
Tasman's instructions from the Dutch East India Company, which financed his expedition, 
reveal one of our central themes: international economic relations, including trade and investment, 
involve both risk and opportunity. As Michael King explains:2 
… Tasman's primary responsibility was not cartographical. It was to seek opportunities for gold and 
silver, spices and fabric. And if the expedition discovered precious metals and minerals, Tasman was to 
represent himself "not to be too eager for [them] in order to keep the wild savages unaware of the value 
of the same". 
The more functional relevance of the Netherlands for our purposes is that it is an example of a 
State that embraces investment treaty arbitration. Since the early 1960s, the Netherlands has signed 
nearly 100 investment treaties, of which over 90 are in force.3   
We temper this approach by offering a United States perspective. One of the authors is, after all, 
a New Yorker. Like New Zealand, New York – and by extension the United States – owes a 
historical debt to the Netherlands:4 
It was founded by the Dutch, who called it New Netherland, but half its residents were from elsewhere. 
Its capital was a tiny collection of rough buildings perched on the edge of a limitless wilderness, but its 
muddy lanes and waterfront were prowled by a Babel of peoples – Norwegians, Germans, Italians, Jews, 
Africans (slaves and free), Walloons, Bohemians, Munsees, Montauks, Mohawks, and many others – all 
living on the rim of empire, struggling to find a way of being together, searching for a balance between 
  
1  Michael King The Penguin History of New Zealand (Penguin Books, New Zealand, 2003) at 99–100. 
2  Ibid, at 94. 
3  See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID] "ICSID Database of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties" <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID> and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development [UNCTAD] Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties at UNCTAD "Investment Instruments 
Online: Bilateral Investment Treaties" (12 December 2012) <www.unctadxi.org/templates>. 
4  Russell Shorto The Island at the Center of the World (Vintage Books, New York, 2005) at 2 and 6. 
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chaos and order, liberty and oppression. Pirates, prostitutes, smugglers and business sharks held sway in 
it. It was Manhattan, in other words, right from the start: a place unlike any other either in the North 
American colonies or anywhere else. 
… 
It has long been recognized that the Dutch Republic in the 1600s was the most progressive and 
culturally diverse society in Europe. … The Netherlands of this time was the melting pot of Europe. The 
Dutch Republic's policy of tolerance made it a haven for everyone from Descartes to John Locke to 
exiled English royalty to peasants from across Europe. When this society founded a colony based on 
Manhattan Island, that colony had the same features of tolerance, openness, and free trade that existed in 
the home country. Those features helped make New York unique, and in time, influenced America in 
some elemental ways.  
The United States is party to nearly 50 different investment treaties, including the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).5 However, the United States has revised its approach to 
investment treaties over time in an attempt to ensure that its investment treaties strike a balance 
between its ability to regulate freely in the public interest domestically and the protections it offers 
to foreign investors. This "balanced" approach provides a foil for the more expansive approach 
adopted by the Netherlands.   
The United States can also be expected to play a central role in the current Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) negotiations. These negotiations aim to create a massive free-trade zone covering 
the Asia-Pacific region. The States currently involved in negotiations are New Zealand, Australia, 
Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, Canada, Mexico, and the United States.6 Japan 
and Thailand may soon join.7 An agreement between these States would redefine the international 
legal framework governing trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. It would also have a 
number of implications for the domestic legal systems of those States, including New Zealand. 
New Zealand is currently party to only three international instruments that provide for binding 
investor-State dispute resolution.8 It has never been sued by a foreign investor. And no New 
  
5  See the legal text of the North American Free Trade Agreement 32 ILM 289 (opened for signature 17 
December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994). 
6  New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT] "Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Negotiations" (24 February 2012) <www.mfat.govt.nz>. 
7  See Yoshihiko Noda, former Prime Minister of Japan "Press Conference by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 
on the Occasion of the 19th APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting" (13 November 2012) Prime Minister of 
Japan and His Cabinet <www.kantei.go.jp>; and Yingluck Shinawatra, Prime Minister of Thailand "Joint 
Press Conference by Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra of Thailand and President Barack Obama of the 
United States" (18 November 2012) Royal Thai Government <www.thaigov.go.th>. 
8  New Zealand only has three treaties in force that offer the option of investment treaty arbitration: 
Agreement establishing the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area [2006] NZTS 6 (signed 27 
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Zealand investors are known to have initiated arbitration proceedings against other States. This will 
change – and change suddenly – if any TPP agreement provides for compulsory investor-State 
dispute resolution. New Zealand investors will enjoy enforceable standards of protection in a 
number of key overseas markets; at the same time, New Zealand will be exposed to potential claims 
by aggrieved investors from some of the world's largest economies, including – depending on 
planning and policy – in the domestic, regulatory space. The TPP negotiations are thus likely to 
present New Zealand with a choice about how to approach investment treaty arbitration.   
This is a choice that should not be made lightly. It also requires an appreciation of history and 
context – to which we turn.   
II INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW9 
Treaty-based protections for foreign investment have developed in response to the inadequacies 
of the international legal framework. 
In the absence of agreement by the host State to arbitrate disputes directly with foreign 
investors, an aggrieved foreign investor has inauspicious options. One solution is for the investor to 
negotiate directly with the host State to get some form of redress. There is little doubt that achieving 
a solution through negotiation is desirable and may even preserve the relationship between the 
investor and the host State. Sadly, a negotiated solution is often impossible. A host State's conduct 
may be motivated by domestic political considerations that are inconsistent with the particular 
investment project or the host State may take a hostile view of foreign investment and investors.   
If no negotiated solution is possible, the foreign investor can theoretically seek a remedy in the 
host State's courts. The attractiveness of this option will depend on the impartiality, efficiency, and 
commercial competence of those courts, and the host State's ability to claim sovereign immunity. 
Traditionally, foreign investment flows went from capital exporting States to capital importing 
States. The domestic courts of those countries often did not offer a satisfactory option for resolving 
disputes between foreign investors and the host State. Even when developed economies with well-
  
February 2009, entered into force 1 January 2010), ch 11 at s B [ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA]; 
New Zealand–Malaysia Free Trade Agreement [2010] NZTS 9 (signed 26 October 2009, entered into force 
1 August 2010), ch 10 at s B [New Zealand–Malaysia FTA]; Free Trade Agreement between the 
Government of New Zealand and the Government of the People's Republic of China [2008] NZTS 19 
(signed 7 April 2008, entered into force 1 October 2008), ch 11 at s 2 [China–New Zealand FTA]. 
9  It is not possible to do more than sketch some of the key features of investment treaty arbitration in an 
article of this length. Interested readers are referred to the following general texts by way of introduction to 
this area: Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer Principles of International Investment Law (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2012); Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger 
International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (Oxford University Press, New York, 2007); 
and Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2009). 
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regarded court systems are involved, many investors are reluctant to rely on the courts of the State 
they are trying to sue for a remedy.      
The only other option is for the foreign investor to ask its home State to take action on its behalf. 
One method used by North American and European powers at the beginning of the 20th century was 
so-called "gunboat diplomacy". The phrase itself is something of an oxymoron today, but it is a 
faithful historical description. A good example is the naval blockade imposed by Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Italy on Venezuela, because of Venezuela's refusal to compensate their 
nationals for damage to their property during the Venezuelan Civil War.10 We can only hope that 
this kind of "might is right" action stays consigned to history.  
A more civilised home State response is to espouse the investor's claim before an international 
tribunal. This too has its problems. First, some States required foreign investors to waive the 
benefits of diplomatic protection as a condition of entry. Second, under customary international law, 
espousal is usually only possible if the investor has exhausted all available domestic law remedies. 
Third, the home State may have political and economic interests trumping espousal for a single 
investor. Even in the event of espousal, the investor will not have control over the proceedings and 
will have no guarantee of payment if its home State is successful. This has more to do with the 
historical development of international law as a State-centric system than any principled reason why 
an investor should rely on a third party to bring proceedings on its behalf.  
A ICSID Arbitration 
The concern with State-to-State resolution of foreign investment disputes is that it politicises the 
dispute resolution process. The 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) was motivated by a desire to depoliticise 
foreign investment disputes.11 There are currently nearly 150 State parties to the ICSID 
Convention.12 
The ICSID Convention created a bespoke World Bank forum and legal framework for the 
resolution of investment disputes between State parties and nationals of those States. It also 
  
10  For further examples of "gunboat diplomacy", see Christopher Dugan and others Investor-State Arbitration 
(Oxford University Press, United States, 2008) at 26–27. 
11  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 575 
UNTS 159 (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force on 14 October 1966) [ICSID 
Convention]. New Zealand signed the ICSID Convention on 2 September 1970. The ICSID Convention 
entered into force for New Zealand on 2 May 1980. On the depoliticising role envisaged for ICSID, see 
Ibrahim FI Shihata "Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and 
MIGA" (1986) 1 ICSID Review 1. 
12  As of 25 July 2012, 147 States had signed and ratified the Convention: see ICSID "List of Contracting 
States and Other Signatories of the Convention" (25 July 2012) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID>. 
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established the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (Centre) to administer 
those disputes.13   
The Centre's jurisdiction is limited to "any legal dispute arising out of an investment between a 
Contracting State … and a national of another Contracting State" where the parties have given 
"consent in writing" to the Centre. There are three ways in which consent can be given: (i) in an 
investor-State contract;14 (ii) in a standing offer in domestic legislation;15 or (iii) in a standing offer 
in a treaty.   
The Centre publishes rules of procedure governing the institution and conduct of proceedings, 
including what is required in a request for arbitration, and the process and timeframes to be followed 
for each step of the arbitration.16 Once the Centre registers a request, it is no longer possible to 
withdraw unilaterally from the arbitration proceedings.17 The only options are to settle or to see the 
process through to an award. 
The ICSID system is self-contained and rigorous. Contracting States are required to recognise 
awards and enforce pecuniary obligations imposed under those awards as if they were final 
judgments of their own courts.18 
There is no right to appeal an award under the ICSID Convention to any court.19 Instead, a party 
may in limited circumstances seek to annul the tribunal's award.20 Once an annulment request has 
  
13  Article 1. 
14  See, for an example of this type of contractual dispute resolution clause, Mobil Oil Corp, Mobil Petroleum 
Co Inc and Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd v The Queen (Findings on Liability, Interpretation, and Allied 
Issues) (1989) 4 ICSID Reports 140. 
15  See for example the provision at issue in SPP v Egypt which provided that:  
Investment disputes in respect of the implementation of the provisions of this Law shall be 
settled … within the framework of the [ICSID Convention] to which Egypt has adhered by 
virtue of Law No. 90 of 1971, where it applies.  
The tribunal found that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim on the basis of this provision: Southern Pacific 
Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Egypt (Jurisdiction) ICSID ARB/84/3, 14 April 1988 at [22] [SPP v Egypt]. 
16  The ICSID Rules of Procedure for the Institution of Conciliation and Arbitration Proceedings [ICSID 
Institution Rules] and ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings [ICSID Arbitration Rules] are 
available online at ICSID <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID>. 
17  ICSID Institution Rules, ibid, at r 8. 
18  If recognition and enforcement are sought in a State that is not a party to the ICSID Convention, the 
standard rules governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards set out in the New York Convention apply: 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 330 UNTS 3 (opened for 
signature 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) [New York Convention]. The New York 
Convention also applies to enforcement of non-pecuniary awards. 
19  Article 53. 
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been made, the Secretary-General will appoint an ad hoc committee of three arbitrators, who have 
the authority to annul the award if the requesting party can bring itself within one of the limited 
grounds set out in art 52(1) of the ICSID Convention. The grounds are that: (i) the tribunal was not 
properly constituted; (ii) it has "manifestly exceeded its powers"; (iii) it was corrupt; (iv) there was a 
"serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure"; or (v) there has been a failure to give the 
reasons on which the award was based. This list is exhaustive. 
The success of the ICSID Convention and the Centre is seen in the central role that the Centre 
plays in modern investment treaty arbitration and in particular the fact that it administers the 
majority of investor-State arbitrations.21   
B Modern Investment Treaties 
Treaty-based investment protections are found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 
multilateral investment treaties, or investment chapters embedded in free-trade agreements 
(FTAs).22   
As treaties, these are instruments of international law subject to the rules governing the 
interpretation of treaties in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.23 The importance 
of international law is explicitly addressed in the ICSID Convention, which provides that the 
applicable law of an ICSID Convention dispute is the law agreed between the parties or, if there is 
no agreement, "the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable."24 In practice, 
international law governs treaty disputes. 
Most modern investment treaties share the same basic structure and content. This applies 
irrespective of the geography and cultural history of the contracting States, and irrespective of 
whether the investment protections are in a BIT, multilateral investment treaty or FTA. Negotiating 
treaty-based investment protections with China is different from negotiating a treaty with India, 
which in turn is different from negotiating with the United States, but the final product is likely to 
look very similar. 
  
20  Article 52. 
21 UNCTAD "Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement" (April 2012) <http://unctad.org/en> 
at 1: "The majority of investment cases continues to accrue under ICSID (or under ICSID Additional 
Facility) (in total now 279 cases) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
[UNCITRAL] (126)". 
22  One notable exception is the sector-specific Energy Charter Treaty 2080 UNTS 95 (opened for signature 17 
December 1994, entered into force 16 April 1998) which includes investment protections. 
23  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980). 
24  Article 42(1). 
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C The Scope of the Treaty 
The door opener to an investment treaty is the definitions of "national" and "investment". The 
nationality of corporations for the purposes of a treaty is generally determined by the place of 
incorporation. In some BITs, formal incorporation is all that is required; other BITs require a 
substantive economic relationship between the corporation and the home State, that is headquarters 
based in that State or concrete business activity.25   
The definition of "investment" determines the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal. 
Investment is often defined in broad terms like "every asset that an investor owns or controls, 
directly or indirectly", followed by a non-exhaustive list of examples like real property, shares, and 
intellectual property rights.26 The basic characteristics of an investment compared with a simple 
contract are said to be: (i) a certain duration; (ii) a certain regularity of profit and return; (iii) 
assumption of risk; and (iv) significance for the host State's development.27 As several tribunals 
have found, "investment" is a broader economic concept covering the different interrelated aspects 
of the investment process.28   
D Investor Protection Standards 
The substantive investor protection standards in investment treaties are broadly similar although 
the precise wording varies from treaty to treaty. Given the purpose of treaties, the language focuses 
on protecting foreign investment rather than on defending countervailing State concerns.   
  
25  See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment [2012 United States Model 
bilateral investment treaty [BIT]] (available online at the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
<www.ustr.gov>). Article 1 defines an "enterprise of a Party" as "an enterprise constituted or organized 
under the law of a Party". The IBO Modelovereenkomst [2004 Dutch Model BIT] (available online at 
International Ondernemen of the Central Government (Rijksoverheid) (2004) <www.rijksoverheid.nl>), 
art 1(b)(ii) defines "nationals" as "legal persons constituted under the law of that Contracting Party". 
26  See, for example, 2012 United States Model BIT, ibid, at art 1. See also Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, and Protocol [2005] ATNIF 16 (signed 23 August 2005, entered into 
force 21 July 2007), art 1(a). 
27  Christoph Schreuer The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2009) at [153], citing Fedax NV v Venezuela (Jurisdiction) ICSID ARB/96/3, 11 July 1997 at [22]–
[23]. See also, more generally on the "restrictive approach", Julian Davis Mortenson "The Meaning of 
'Investment': ICSID's Travaux and the Domain of International Investment Law" (2010) 51 Harv Intl L J 
257 at 271–276; and on the general characteristics of an investment, Noah Rubins "The Notion of 
'Investment' in International Investment Arbitration" in Norbert Horn and Stefan Michael Kröll (eds) 
Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2004) 283 at 297–300. 
28  See Biwater Gauff v Tanzania (Award) ICSID ARB/05/22, 24 July 2008 at [316]. For a more general 
discussion on the definition of "investment", see Dolzer and Schreuer, above n 9, at 66–76. 
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The core list of these treaty standards includes: (i) national treatment; (ii) most favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment; (iii) fair and equitable treatment (FET); (iv) full protection and security; and (v) 
protection against expropriation without full compensation.   
The first two standards are relative ones. National treatment is meant to protect a foreign 
investor from treatment less favourable than that received by host State nationals. MFN treatment is 
meant to protect a foreign investor from treatment less favourable than that received by third State 
investors. 
In comparison, the FET and full protection and security standards set baselines below which a 
host State's conduct is not to fall. The FET standard is one of the most commonly pleaded – and 
most elusive – standards in investment treaty arbitration. A key challenge facing arbitral tribunals is 
how to develop an analytical framework within which to apply this standard. Professor Campbell 
McLachlan QC explains the way in which the standard captures a broad range of principles:29 
… the general principles informing the standard flow from its character as an instrument of supervision 
at the international law level of the processes of governmental decision-making at national level. The 
standard is concerned with due process in decision-making, and not with substantive outcomes. It 
requires the application of fundamental rule-of-law values in decision-making: predictability; 
accessibility; impartiality; and natural justice, as contrasted with arbitrary action.   
We would add only that, in our view, the supervision to which Professor McLachlan refers 
extends beyond the formal process of governmental decision-making to include representations 
made by a host State to a foreign investor. If a host State creates legitimate expectations in a foreign 
investor, it should fairly be held to them.   
The full protection and security standard is principally concerned with the host State's exercise 
of its police power. It imposes a positive obligation on host States to protect an investment from the 
actions or inaction (failure to protect) of State officials. 
Another key protection in investment treaties is the prohibition against unlawful expropriation. 
Treaties usually provide that a State can lawfully expropriate foreign investors' investments only if 
the taking is: (i) for a public purpose; (ii) not arbitrary or discriminatory; and (iii) accompanied by 
full compensation. Historic expropriations of investments have largely (but not wholly) been 
replaced by more subtle regulatory expropriations – opening up policy arguments about how to 
draw the line between indirect or creeping expropriation and legitimate regulation in the public 
interest. 
  
29  Campbell McLachlan "Investment Treaties and General International Law" (2008) 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 361 at 400. 
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E "Arbitration Without Privity" 
The real muscle of modern investment treaties is the right of foreign investors to sue host States 
directly before an international arbitration tribunal for breach of the substantive protection standards 
in those treaties. 
Most modern investment treaties include dispute resolution clauses in which States agree to 
submit disputes with aggrieved investors from the other contracting States to international 
arbitration. Unless accompanied by an express reservation or qualified in some other way, this will 
be construed as a standing offer to arbitrate disputes with investors from the other contracting 
States.30   
The 2004 Dutch Model BIT offers an example of such a clause:31 
Each Contracting Party hereby consents to submit any legal dispute arising between that Contracting 
Party and a national of the other Contracting Party concerning an investment of that national in the 
territory of the former Contracting Party to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes for settlement by conciliation or arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, opened for signature at Washington 
on 18 March 1965. 
To accept this type of offer, an aggrieved investor simply needs to follow the process set out in 
the clause and any relevant institutional rules – here, ICSID. This represents a significant 
development in international law because it enables a private entity to sue a State without a 
contractual arrangement between the investor and the State.   
In a prescient 1996 article, our colleague Jan Paulsson coined the phrase "arbitration without 
privity" to describe this feature of modern investment treaties. Paulsson offered the following 
insight:32   
The possibility of direct action – international arbitration without privity – allows the true complainant 
to face the true defendant. This has the immense merit of clarity and realism; these virtues, and not 
eloquent proclamations, are the prerequisites of confidence in the legal process. 
F An Evolving System 
Initial uptake of the ICSID arbitration avenue was slow. The first known investor-State 
arbitration was initiated by Asian Agricultural Products Ltd (AAPL) against the Government of Sri 
  
30  Christoph Schreuer "The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System" in Rainer Hofmann and Christian J 
Tams (eds) The International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID):Taking Stock 
after 40 Years (Nomos Publishers, Baden-Baden, 2007) 15 at 18. 
31  Article 9. 
32  Jan Paulsson "Arbitration Without Privity" (1995) 10 ICSID Foreign Investment Law Journal 232 at 256. 
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Lanka for the destruction of a shrimp farm by Government forces in 1987. Sri Lanka did not 
challenge jurisdiction and the tribunal found that AAPL was entitled to initiate ICSID arbitration on 
the basis of Sri Lanka's unilateral offer to submit disputes to arbitration in art 8(1) of the United 
Kingdom–Sri Lanka BIT.33 In 1990, the tribunal awarded compensation to AAPL. 
If investment treaty arbitrations were slow to take off, the last 20 years have seen an explosion 
in both the number of treaties and the number of disputes going to arbitration. The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development reported in April 2012 that at least 46 cases were filed in 
2011 alone – the highest number of investment treaty arbitrations filed in a single year.34 This 
brought the total number of known disputes to 450, of which around 220 have been concluded. 
Since many disputes are confidential, the number of disputes may in fact be higher. 
This explosion in investor-State arbitration has had three principal effects. First, investors are 
increasingly aware of the benefits of treaty protections. Sophisticated investors now seek to reduce 
risk to their global investment portfolios by structuring their investments to benefit from treaty 
protections.  
Second, and as a result, this has changed the risk calculus for States when signing up to these 
treaties. States must now take more account of the very real possibility that they will be lobbied or 
sued by aggrieved foreign investors in the wake of host State actions or policies. Further, the 
traditional capital exporting/capital importing dichotomy is breaking down and an increasing 
number of BITs are being entered into between developed economies. This means the likelihood 
that traditional capital exporting countries will face treaty arbitration is steadily increasing. This is 
particularly true in the case of multilateral FTAs which often involve two or more developed 
economies.    
Third, the various arbitrations and awards have road-tested the legal frameworks for investment 
arbitration established in these treaties. Many were entered into before there was a body of 
investment treaty "jurisprudence" to inform the drafting process. States now have the benefit of 
some 220 known cases and a vast (and ever expanding!) academic literature to guide future treaty 
amendment and drafting efforts.   
This has led many States to reassess their approach to the content of investment treaties. Many 
now explicitly address the relationship between the protections offered to foreign investors and their 
responsibility to regulate in the public interest, particularly in areas like national security, 
environmental protection and human rights. In the absence of explicit textual support, tribunals have 
also drawn on other areas of international law – such as international trade law and international 
  
33  Asian Agricultural Products Ltd v Sri Lanka (Final Award) ICSID ARB/87/3, 27 June 1990. In 1985, an 
ICSID tribunal had found jurisdiction in the SPP v Egypt dispute on the basis of a provision in the Egyptian 
foreign investment law: see SPP v Egypt, above n 15. 
34  UNCTAD, above n 21, at 1. 
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human rights law – to interpret investment treaties to balance the tension between investor 
protection and countervailing State interests. The different State responses to investment treaty 
arbitration are considered next.     
III STATE RESPONSES TO INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION 
A An "Open Door" Policy 
Some States have done little to adapt their existing treaties. A good example is the Netherlands, 
which seeks to attract foreign investors by offering access to its network of double taxation and 
investment treaties. The Netherlands concluded its first BIT in 196335 and had signed just under 100 
BITs by 2010.36   
The 2004 Dutch Model BIT maintains an open door policy by offering arbitration (see the 
provision above at Part II B 3), broadly defining "investment" and perhaps most importantly 
defining "national" as it applies to corporations to require only that the company be incorporated in 
accordance with the laws of the Netherlands. Absent a requirement for a substantive economic 
connection between the Netherlands and the relevant company, so-called "shell" Dutch companies 
can seek the protection of Dutch treaties. In Saluka v Czech Republic,37 for example, Saluka 
Investments BV was a Dutch subsidiary incorporated in the Netherlands by the Nomura Group for 
the purposes of investing in the Czech Republic banking sector. The Czech Republic raised a 
jurisdictional challenge against Saluka's ability to claim Dutch nationality for the purposes of the 
treaty. The tribunal rejected the challenge on the basis that this issue was to be determined in 
accordance with the text of the treaty and the text was clear that nothing more than Dutch 
incorporation was required. 
Further, the substantive investment protection standards in the 2004 Dutch Model BIT are 
broadly framed, with environmental and labour considerations relegated to the Preamble. Although 
this style of investment treaty has been criticised for failing to take into account countervailing State 
interests, such as human rights and environmental concerns, criticisms can be overblown. This 
treaty structure is not a blank cheque to compensate foreign investors for any and all impact on 
profits caused by legitimate regulation. There is much room in international law to balance these 
tensions, and a proper role for arbitrators, counsel, and academics in the process. An "open door" in 
treaties like those of the Netherlands is not a one-way door. 
  
35 See Roos van Ors and Roeline Knottnerus Dutch Bilateral Investment Treaties: a gateway to 'treaty 
shopping' for investment protection by multinational companies (SOMO, Amsterdam, 2011) at 16. 
36 Ibid.  
37  Saluka v Czech Republic (Partial Award) (2006) 15 ICSID Reports 274. 
 OLD SEELAND, NEW NETHERLAND AND NEW ZEALAND 699 
B  The Malcontents 
In contrast, several countries have flat-out rejected investment treaty arbitration. This group 
includes Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. This is not surprising given their 
unprecedented track record at ICSID – these five States have faced being respondents in 109 of the 
450 claims brought under the ICSID Convention.38  
Venezuela became the third country to withdraw from the ICSID Convention in January 2012, 
following Bolivia in 2007 and Ecuador in 2010.39 A press release by the Venezuelan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs blames the perceived ideological bias of the ICSID system as one of its reasons for 
withdrawal. Venezuela claims that ICSID tribunals have "ruled 232 times in favour of transnational 
interests out of the 234 cases filed throughout its history".40 In fact, the ICSID statistics show that 
States are more often successful than investors.41 
Australia is a surprising recent addition to the malcontents. Australia is not withdrawing from its 
existing treaty obligations but it has publicly taken the position that it will no longer enter into 
treaties providing for investor-State arbitration.42   
This must be seen against the backdrop of the treaty arbitration brought by Philip Morris over 
proposed "plain packaging" legislation for tobacco products. Philip Morris' claim is that the "plain 
packaging" legislation breaches its rights to be treated fairly and equitably and amounts to 
expropriation of its intellectual property rights in branding.43 The Philip Morris tribunal will 
  
38  See UNCTAD, above n 21, at Annex 2. 
39  Bolivia filed its notification of withdrawal under art 71 of the ICSID Convention on 2 May 2007; Ecuador 's 
notification was filed on 7 January 2010; and Venezuela's notification was filed on 24 January 2012. News 
releases of all three denunciations are available online at ICSID <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID>. See 
also, more generally, Andrés A Mezgravis and Carolina González "Denunciation of the ICSID Convention: 
Two Problems, One Seen and One Overlooked" (2012) 9 TDM 1. 
40  This is a free translation of a press release by the Government of Venezuela "Gobierno Bolivariano 
denuncia convenio con CIADI" (25 January 2012) Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
<www.mre.gov.ve>. 
41  As of 30 June 2012, ICSID's statistics indicate that only 48 per cent of claims in which a tribunal has 
delivered a final award on the merits have resulted in the investor's claim being upheld in part or in full: see 
ICSID "ICSID Caseload Statistics: Issue 2012–2" (30 June 2012) <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID> at 
13. 
42  Government of Australia "Gillard Government Trade Policy Statement: Trading our way to more jobs and 
prosperity" (April 2011) Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade <www.dfat.gov.au> at 14. 
This was based on the recommendations of the Australian Productivity Commission in its report Bilateral 
and Regional Trade Agreements (13 December 2010) (available online at 
<www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/trade-agreements/report>). 
43  Letter from Allens Arthur Robinson (Lawyers for Philip Morris Asia Ltd) to the Hon Robert McClelland 
MP (Attorney-General for Australia) regarding Philip Morris Asia Ltd's Notice of Claim Under the 
Australia/Hong Kong Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (15 July 2011) (available 
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consider whether these alleged treaty rights, if proven, trump Australia's ability to regulate for 
public health purposes, under international law. The decision is in the future. We note only that it is 
a very different thing for a State to be sued, and defend itself, than to lose and face an award.   
Australian investors face the consequences of their Government's new policy. The recent 2011 
decision in White Industries Australia Ltd v India is a good example of the benefits of investment 
protection to Australian investors.44 White Industries, an Australian company, had been seeking to 
enforce a commercial arbitral award against an Indian construction company for almost a decade, 
but had been unable to do so due to various impediments in the Indian court system. White 
Industries initiated arbitration against the Government of India under the India–Australia BIT, and 
successfully argued that the MFN clause granted it the protection of a more favourable provision in 
the India–Kuwait BIT, which required the States to provide foreign investors with an "effective 
means of asserting claims".45 The tribunal concluded that India had denied White Industries an 
"effective means" to enforce its rights, and ordered India to pay the amount of the commercial 
arbitration award to White Industries. If Australia's new policy had been in place, White Industries 
would still be unpaid. 
Australia's rejection of investor-State arbitration in future treaties means that the inclusion of 
compulsory investor-State arbitration is certain to be one topic of debate in the TPP negotiations.46 
If an investor-State arbitration provision is included in the final text of the TPP, Australia is likely to 
seek to protect its position by negotiating a carve-out such as the one entered into with New Zealand 
over the investment chapter to the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA.47 
C  The "Balanced" Approach 
A number of States are taking a middle-of-the-road approach to treaty arbitration. These States 
have existing BIT programmes but are reviewing their approach to negotiating new treaties in light 
  
online at Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade <http://dfat.gov.au/foi/downloads/dfat-foi-11-
20550.pdf>). 
44  White Industries Australia Ltd v India (Final Award) UNCITRAL, 30 November 2011. We note that Planet 
Mining Pty Ltd, an Australian-based mining company, has just registered a claim with ICSID against 
Indonesia: see Planet Mining Pty Ltd v Indonesia ICSID ARB/12/40. 
45  Agreement between the Republic of India and the State of Kuwait for the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (signed 27 November 2001, entered into force 28 June 2003), art 4(5). See also 
the tribunal's decision on this point: White Industries Australia Ltd v India, ibid, at [11.2.1]–[11.2.9]. 
46  Australian Productivity Commission, above n 42, at 275–276. 
47  See Letter from Hon Tim Groser (New Zealand Minister of Trade) to Hon Simon Crean (Australian 
Minister for Trade) regarding the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area negotiations (27 
February 2009) (available online at <www.aseanfta.govt.nz>). 
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of lessons learned in the last 20 years.48 A leading example is the United States, which revised its 
Model BIT in 2004 and again in 2012. 
The United States Model BIT contains a number of innovative drafting developments designed 
to improve the substance and process of investment treaties entered into by the United States. 
Although it contains broad definitions of "investor" and "investment", the treaty also contains a 
strong denial of benefits clause allowing the host State to deny the benefits of the treaty to parties 
without substantial business activities in the home State.49 
The United States Model BIT contains broad protections for foreign investors in its national 
treatment and MFN standards that extend to the "establishment" and "acquisition" of both investors 
and investments.50 The FET and full protection and security standards expressly do not require 
treatment above the (bare) minimum standard of treatment under customary international law.51   
The expropriation standard is to be interpreted in light of an expropriation annex that more 
clearly distinguishes between direct and indirect expropriation.52 It also expressly provides that non-
discriminatory regulatory actions by a party to protect legitimate public welfare objectives will 
rarely be considered an indirect expropriation.53 
The United States Model BIT includes specific provisions dealing with environmental concerns 
and labour rights. The environmental provision explicitly recognises the rights of parties to exercise 
discretion with respect to regulatory, compliance, and investigatory matters.54 It also recognises that 
environmental laws should not be weakened or reduced to encourage investment.55 Environmental 
laws are defined broadly to include statutes or regulations with the primary purpose of protecting the 
environment or preventing danger to human, animal or plant life or health.56 A similar provision 
  
48  Republic of South Africa Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review (Department of Trade and 
Industry, Executive Summary of Government Position, June 2009) at 5. See also on this topic Dr Rob 
Davies, Minister of Trade and Industry of the Republic of South Africa "Speaking notes at the Discussion of 
UNCTAD's Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development" (UNCTAD's 59th Trade and 
Development Board Meeting, Geneva, 24 September 2012).  
49  Article 17(2). 
50  Articles 3 and 4. 
51  Article 5. 
52  Annex B. 
53  Annex B (4)(b). 
54  Article 12. 
55  Article 13. 
56  Article 12. 
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applies in respect of domestic labour laws.57 There is also a specific carve-out for measures that a 
party considers necessary to fulfil its obligations for maintaining and restoring international peace 
and security or protection of its own essential security interests.58 
The United States Model BIT contains a number of procedural innovations. If a host State 
claims that a measure alleged to be a breach is within the scope of a specific exception, the host 
State can request and the tribunal must ask for an interpretation of the relevant provision by the 
parties. A joint decision by the contracting States on the issues will be binding on the tribunal. 
The United States Model BIT also requires greater transparency in investor-State arbitration. All 
the key documents submitted to a host State must be made available to the public59 and the 
tribunal's hearings must be conducted in public.60 The other contracting States are entitled to make 
oral and written submissions on the interpretation of the treaty,61 and the tribunal is able to invite 
amicus curiae submissions from third parties.62 
IV  NEW ZEALAND'S TREATY PRACTICE 
A New Zealand's Existing Exposure to Investment Treaty Arbitration 
New Zealand is currently party to three FTAs that provide for compulsory investor-State dispute 
resolution: the 2008 China–New Zealand FTA, the 2009 ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, and 
the 2009 Malaysia–New Zealand FTA, which builds on the trade and investment provisions 
Malaysia and New Zealand agreed to as part of the broader negotiations with Australia and the other 
ASEAN nations (Brunei, Myanmar, Singapore, the Philippines and Vietnam). 
New Zealand's investment chapters in these three FTAs reflect the "balanced" approach to 
investment treaty arbitration described above. Each of the investment chapters in these FTAs 
preserves regulatory space for the New Zealand Government in areas of national interest. This is 
reflected in several provisions.   
The national treatment provisions apply only post-establishment of an investment, thereby 
preserving the ability of the New Zealand Government to control the process whereby foreign 
investments are allowed.63 In both the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA and the Malaysia–
  
57  Article 13. 
58  Article 18. See also arts 17(1) and 29(4). 
59  Article 29(1). 
60  Article 29(2). 
61  Article 28(2). 
62  Article 28(3). 
63  China–New Zealand FTA, above n 8, at art 138. 
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New Zealand FTA, the national treatment obligation does not apply to certain existing measures, 
sectors, and activities set out in annexes.  
The MFN provisions (only in the China–New Zealand and Malaysia–New Zealand FTAs) 
expressly do not apply to dispute resolution procedures, limiting investors from using the MFN 
avenue to obtain the benefit of "better" dispute resolution processes under different investment 
treaties.64   
The China–New Zealand FTA draws on the approach to expropriation found in the United 
States Model BIT by requiring that the treaty text must be read together with an expropriation annex 
that defines in greater detail the precise meaning of both direct and indirect expropriation.65 This is 
intended to limit tribunal findings of direct or creeping expropriation through regulation in the 
public interest. This same approach is also found in the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA and 
the Malaysia–New Zealand FTA.66 
One significant difference between the three New Zealand FTAs is the FET standard. In the 
China–New Zealand FTA, this standard is free-standing and not expressly tied to the customary 
international law minimum standard, allowing an interpretation higher than the customary 
international law standard requiring egregious or shocking conduct by the State.67 In both the 
ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA and the Malaysia–New Zealand FTA, the link between the 
FET standard and the customary international law minimum standard is expressly made.68  
The New Zealand FTAs with China and Malaysia also include extensive general exceptions 
designed to preserve State flexibility. There are two types of exceptions. First, the New Zealand 
FTAs with China and Malaysia directly incorporate the two key general exception provisions in 
international trade law: art XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and art XIV of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. These general exceptions are applicable to the entire trade 
agreements, including their investment chapters, and are intended to allow regulatory space to 
pursue certain public objectives such as public health and protection of natural resources.69 Second, 
  
64  China–New Zealand FTA, above n 8, at art 139; New Zealand–Malaysia FTA, above n 8, at art 10.21(6). 
But see for more limited incorporation of these provisions the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, above 
n 8. 
65 China–New Zealand FTA, above n 8, at Annex 13. 
66  New Zealand–Malaysia FTA, above n 8, at Annex 7; ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, above n 8, at 
Annex 13. 
67  China–New Zealand FTA, above n 8, at art 154. 
68  New Zealand–Malaysia FTA, above n 8, at art 10.10(2)(c); ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, above n 
8, at art 6(c). 
69  China–New Zealand FTA, above n 8, at art 200. See also New Zealand–Malaysia FTA, above n 8, at art 
10.21(6). But see for more limited incorporation of these provisions the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand 
FTA, above n 8, at art 79. The fact that the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA does not include 
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the China–New Zealand FTA includes a list of specific exceptions including: measures to protect 
essential security interests; measures to safeguard the balance of payments; measures to preserve the 
stability of the financial system; taxation measures; measures necessary to fulfil obligations under 
the Treaty of Waitangi; and specific exceptions for measures to protect New Zealand's artistic and 
cultural heritage.70 The Malaysia–New Zealand FTA contains similar specific exceptions.71 
B New Zealand's Choice 
The fact that New Zealand has signed so few treaties to date leaves it well-placed to make an 
informed assessment of the risks and opportunities of investment treaty arbitration unencumbered 
by an existing treaty practice. Very few developed economies are able to assess the potential 
strengths and weaknesses of the investment treaty system with such a clean slate and so much 
information.  
The good news is that New Zealand has the choice whether to make greater use of that system, 
weighing whether its risks outweigh the potential benefits to New Zealand and New Zealand 
investors. The bad news is that New Zealand is unlikely to have much time for reflection. In 
addition to bilateral negotiations for FTAs with India, Russia, and Hong Kong,72 the TPP 
negotiations alone include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, the 
United States and Vietnam.73 Japan and Thailand may also join the negotiations.74 The United 
States has set a target of the end of 2013 to close the deal.75 
The proposed TPP will reshape the economic relations between the contracting States, including 
New Zealand: that is, after all, one of its central objectives. The fact that the investment protections 
in FTAs like the TPP are embedded within broader trade agreements makes it more difficult to 
anticipate the outcome. Investment protections need to be agreed by all the negotiating parties but 
are themselves likely to be subject to trade-offs during negotiations over other measures in the 
agreement. However, given the general alignment on approach between the 2012 United States 
  
provisions as extensive as those found in New Zealand's FTAs with China and Malaysia may suggest that 
Brunei, Singapore and Vietnam will be more resistant to their inclusion in any Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement. 
70  Articles 200–205. 
71  Article 10.21(6). 
72  See MFAT "Trade Relationships and Agreements" (19 December 2012) <www.mfat.govt.nz>. 
73  MFAT, above n 6. 
74  See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development "Thailand Expresses Interest in Joining 
Trans-Pacific Trade Talks, as TPP Leaders Set New Deadline" Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest (online 
ed, 21 November 2012). 
75  See Ian F Fergusson and others The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Issues for Congress 
(Congressional Research Service, 24 January 2013). 
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Model BIT, NAFTA, and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, it may be safe to predict that 
there will likely be general agreement for a "balanced" approach in the investment chapter in the 
TPP agreement.     
The early indications are that the TPP will include an investment chapter with substantive legal 
protections for investors and mandatory investor-State dispute resolution: in 2011, the negotiating 
States issued a statement confirming that the proposed TPP would include "expeditious, fair, and 
transparent investor-State dispute settlement subject to appropriate safeguards."76   
New Zealand is likely to face a choice: should it embrace the developing system of investment 
treaty arbitration or opt out of it?77 This is not a decision to be made lightly and it is likely to be 
difficult to reverse once made. There have been various attempts in New Zealand by pro- and anti-
TPP advocates to try to sway public opinion.78 Neither side appears (yet) to have been successful. 
Williams and Kawharu summarise the position in their text:79 
New Zealand's evolving position on investment treaty arbitration will depend partly on negotiating and 
political factors. It will also depend partly upon whether – as a matter of principle – New Zealand 
approaches investment treaty arbitration as a system which can be made useful and tolerably safe 
through appropriate and careful drafting; or as a system which, by its very nature, is more dangerous 
than it is beneficial. There is no doubt that the investment treaty regime is a developing global legal 
system. New Zealand is still determining what part it wishes to play in the development and refinement 
of that system. 
Precisely. 
V  REFLECTIONS 
Like any system, investment treaty arbitration has strengths and weaknesses. We reflect on some 
of them and hopefully dispel some of the myths that have developed about this area of international 
law.  
  
76  Office of the United States Trade Representative Enhancing Trade and Investment, Supporting Jobs and 
Economic Growth and Development: Outlines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (12 November 
2011). 
77  One possible option if New Zealand does not want to take on the risk of investment treaty arbitration is to 
opt out in the way New Zealand and Australia did in the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA, above n 8.  
78  Open Letter from Lawyers to the Negotiators of the [TPP] Urging the Rejection of Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (8 May 2012) (available online at <http://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/>). See also Open 
Letter from various signatories to John Key (Prime Minister of New Zealand) in Support of the TPP 
negotiations (3 December 2012) (available online at <http://media.nzherald.co.nz/webcontent/document/ 
pdf/201249/tp2.pdf>). 
79  David AR Williams and Amokura Kawharu Williams & Kawharu on Arbitration (LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2011) at 896. 
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First, investment decisions are typically complex and are rarely made on the basis of one factor 
alone. If a host State has a transparent court system, an independent judiciary and the rule of law, 
investors may be attracted by investment opportunities even though international arbitration is not 
on offer. Even without these attractions, an investor may decide to take its chances because the 
potential rewards outweigh the risks. Ultimately, these are commercial decisions.   
In our experience, many investors see treaty protections as an added benefit that allows them to 
reduce some of the risk of their investment. Investors are becoming increasingly interested in 
structuring their investments to make sure they get the benefit of treaty protection. This means that 
commercial lawyers need to be aware of how their clients stand to benefit from treaty protections. 
Foreign investors looking to invest in New Zealand and New Zealand investors looking to invest 
overseas will expect advice on how to structure their investments to benefit from treaty-based 
investor protections. If the TPP goes forward, a European company may choose to invest in New 
Zealand through a subsidiary in the United States to obtain TPP investment protections. Similarly, a 
New Zealand company looking to invest in Latin America may incorporate a subsidiary in the 
Netherlands to gain access to its investment treaties with Latin American States. 
Second, there is an arbitration risk. If you give foreign investors the right to sue you, there is a 
risk – even a likelihood – that they will seek to use it. But, as mentioned above, a balanced 
assessment needs to be undertaken. There is too much scaremongering in this area. A responsible 
and well-advised government should not be afraid of getting sued. There is no reason why a State 
cannot back itself to win, by making a persuasive case justifying its conduct. As Daniel Kalderimis 
has noted:80 
The risks of investor-state arbitration should not be overstated. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
the United States and Australia have, for instance, never lost an investment case (though Germany did 
settle one claim). This is not surprising as investment treaties guarantee minimum rights, not flawless 
regulation.  
This does place the onus on officials to advise the Government well on the international law 
implications of different policies. If they do that, any risk of an adverse arbitration award can be 
minimised. And ministers will expect to be warned in advance of the possibility that a policy 
initiative may infringe a foreign investor's legitimate "rights".81  
  
80  Daniel Kalderimis "Investor-State Arbitration and the TPP: Should You Be Concerned?" (1 June 2012) 
AMINZ <www.aminz.org.nz>.  
81  We note that as awareness of New Zealand's international trade and investment treaties increases, domestic 
lawyers may seek to challenge administrative decision-making before the New Zealand courts. The courts 
have held in the context of unincorporated human rights treaties that New Zealand's international 
obligations are mandatory relevant considerations to be taken into account in administrative decision-
making (see Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257 (CA)) and that discretionary powers must 
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It is also crucial to look at the protections that are actually offered to investors: fair and equitable 
treatment – whether or not it is tied to the customary international law minimum standard; freedom 
from expropriation without full compensation; equal treatment with host State nationals; and equal 
treatment with investors from other States. These are not onerous standards. The specific exceptions 
in New Zealand's treaty protections maintain sufficient space to regulate in the public interest. In 
those circumstances, States like New Zealand should arguably be keeping these standards whether 
obliged by a treaty or not. If a State violates one of these standards, it does not seem controversial 
that it should pay compensation to make the investor whole.  
Third, there is also sometimes criticism that private international tribunals are making decisions 
with potentially significant policy and financial implications for host States. But look at who is 
actually making these decisions. Arbitrators are typically senior lawyers with international law 
expertise, including law professors, leading barristers and retired members of the judiciary. The fact 
they are not from an investor's country or the host States is a strength of the system. New Zealand 
already makes a distinguished contribution to international investment arbitration. David Williams 
QC, Sir Kenneth Keith, Professor Campbell McLachlan QC and other New Zealanders sit as 
arbitrators in investor-State disputes. Many more represent investors and States before international 
tribunals. This should increase as investment treaty arbitration comes closer to home in New 
Zealand. It is no coincidence that the first comprehensive arbitration text in New Zealand, Williams 
& Kawharu on Arbitration, was published in 2011 and devoted several chapters to investment treaty 
arbitration. 
Fourth, investment treaty arbitration is a two-way street. We expect to see a reaction in Australia 
to the new policy particularly among mining companies. There are a number of reasons why the 
chief executive officer or general counsel of a New Zealand outbound investor might be reluctant to 
subject the company to Chinese, Indian or Russian court systems. It is also unrealistic to expect that 
the New Zealand Government would be quick to pressure the Chinese, Indian, or Russian 
Governments diplomatically. Investment treaty arbitration "allows the true complainant to face the 
true defendant".82      
Fifth, investment arbitration is an evolving system. The recent wave of cases has exposed the 
tension between an investor's international rights and the host State's ability to regulate. A detailed 
exploration of this tension and attempts to balance it is beyond the scope of this article. However, 
some brief comments may help illustrate the evolution of investment treaty law. Bearing in mind 
that the tribunal's ultimate task is to apply a particular treaty to a particular set of facts, the way in 
which other tribunals have resolved similar problems may assist the process. However, this 
  
be interpreted and exercised consistently with those international obligations (see Attorney-General v Zaoui 
& Ors (No 2) [2005] NZSC 38, [2006] 1 NZLR 289 at [91]). 
82  See Paulsson, above n 32, at 256. 
708 (2012) 43 VUWLR 
"jurisprudential" approach also exposes the normative ambiguity within the structure of investment 
treaty arbitration because the development of treaty-based investment protection has been ad hoc, 
decentralised and, until the recent trend toward broad FTAs with investment protection, largely 
bilateral. There has been little room for analysis of the possible investment treaty norms or the 
inherent risks of generalising beyond a particular treaty or transplanting doctrines from other parts 
of international law such as international trade or international human rights law into investment 
dispute resolution. 
Facing State concerns about the tension between State regulation in the public interest and 
foreign investor rights, and criticism of arbitrators as unelected regulators, it is critical to recall that 
States control the treaty drafting process. Ultimately, States can undo obligations they have 
previously entered into if they so decide, albeit with delays. Like New Zealand, more States are 
likely to adopt a more "balanced" approach to drafting investment treaties in the future, drawing on 
the lessons of the past 20 years.  
In the interim, counsel and arbitrators can consider (within reason) the interpretive resources 
existing within the international legal system. There is significant potential in what Professor 
McLachlan has called "the principle of systemic integration"83 – art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties84 – to harmonise different international norms through the 
process of interpretation. Article 31(3)(c) is an interpretive rule and does not compel any particular 
substantive result, but it nevertheless represents a useful tool for determining which norms – 
investor protection, public interest regulation or, not infrequently, both – trump the others. 
Obviously, the determination of the relevance of an international norm turns on the particular facts 
and the text of the treaty at issue. If relevance can be established, art 31(3)(c) allows the investor 
protection standard to be interpreted consistently with the relevant principle of international law or 
treaty obligation. The presumption is that States intend to act consistently with general principles of 
international law when they enter into a treaty and do not intend to sign up to treaties that put them 
in breach of other international obligations. This type of interpretive approach pre-empts a conflict 
of norms. 
Finally, providing for direct arbitration of foreign investment disputes embodies the rule of law 
at the international level. Remember the lessons of history: Venezuela may be one of the most sued 
States at ICSID today, but – unlike the turn of the 20th century – there are no foreign warships 
sitting in Venezuela's ports. 
  
83  Campbell McLachlan "The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention" (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279. 
84  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, above n 23.  
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VI  CONCLUSION 
New Zealand is in an enviable position to decide for itself what use it wants to make of 
investment treaty arbitration. Unlike many States, New Zealand is unencumbered by old-style 
existing treaties, has the benefit of more than 220 investment treaty decisions, and the time to assess 
the rumours about this area of international law. 
The choice ultimately boils down to a case-by-case balancing of New Zealand's inbound–
outbound investment situation with the other contracting States and New Zealand's confidence in its 
ability to manage the risk. Yes, there is every chance that New Zealand will find itself sued before 
an international arbitration tribunal by an aggrieved investor under one of its FTAs in the future. 
But, no, there is no reason why New Zealand should not expect to prevail with careful treaty 
drafting and good regulation.   
It is appropriate to finish with the cautionary note on which we started: investment treaty 
arbitration gives rise to both risk and opportunity. This is true of international economic relations 
generally. Tasman's expedition came to New Zealand all those years ago looking for precious 
metals, but they left New Zealand empty-handed after an ill-fated encounter with the indigenous 
population. Tasman called the scene of this encounter Murderers Bay. The irony of course is that 
gold – the very metal Tasman had been sent to find – was discovered there many years later by the 
British, who gave the bay its modern name: Golden Bay.  
Whatever decision New Zealand makes about investment treaty arbitration, it is to be hoped that 
it will facilitate more profitable and enduring relationships than Tasman's expedition all those years 
ago.   
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